For the NUTS II EU regions we estimate the wage equation that is central to the new economic geography literature. Our first main finding is that a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions. Next, we analyze what our estimations imply for the link between the free-ness of trade and agglomeration for the EU regions. Based on multi-region simulations we find that the implied free-ness of trade is such that the degree of agglomeration is still limited. This conclusion is supported by evidence based on bilateral industry trade data. Our analysis also illustrates the current limitations of empirical research in new economic geography.
Introduction
In his review of Fujita et al. (1999) but in fact of the whole New Economic Geography (NEG) literature, Neary (2001) reminds us that the real test for the NEG is to go beyond mere theory and to bring out its empirical and policy relevance. This paper addresses the empirical relevance of the NEG. In doing so, we take the basic message of Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1341) , "estimate don't test" seriously. We will show the usefulness of the NEG, but we will not really test it against alternative theories, though we will control for fixed or 1st nature geography. We also take the second message of Leamer and Levinsohn seriously, and that is "don't treat theory too casually". For this paper their advice means that our empirical analysis is well grounded in NEG theory and that, in turn, we will explicitly address the theoretical implications of the empirical findings. In doing so, we will have to face the difficulties that arise in NEG models when empirical findings are confronted with the underlying model. In this sense our paper is also about the (current) limitations of empirical research in NEG.
Assessing the empirical relevance of NEG is not easy. It is well known that agglomeration patterns can be found at all levels of aggregation (country, region, or city). But this does not necessarily imply that neo-classical theories of location are without merit. Geographical concentration of factor endowments or pure technological externalities could lead to agglomeration in neo-classical models. In the same vein, the absence of agglomeration does not imply that the NEG models are not relevant. NEG models are characterized by multiple equilibria, of which the symmetric or spreading equilibrium is one. In addition, one could point out that the application of these models to different economies with different (labour market) institutions (like the USA or the EU countries), or to different geographical scales (country versus city level) sits uneasy with the tendency in empirical NEG applications of a 'one size fits all' approach. Finally, from a more methodological angle, there are important questions about the (spatial) econometrics involved as well as about data measurement (see Combes and Overman, 2004 ). The conclusion is that the same empirical facts about agglomeration can be explained using different theoretical approaches, see also the introduction to this special issue. On the one hand this is good news, because it means that the facts are not in search of a theory. On the other hand it leaves unanswered the question as to the relevance of NEG and, within NEG, as to the relevance of specific NEG models. In recent theoretical work by Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004) this last issue is also stressed.
In this paper we will address some of the above issues. More in particular, based on a seminal NEG model (Puga, 1999) that encapsulates the core NEG models, we estimate the equilibrium wage equation. This gives estimates for two key structural model parameters for our sample of the NUTS II EU regions, and it enables us to derive empirically based estimates for the so-called freeness of trade parameter. In doing so we follow the suggestion by Mayer (2004, p. 2663) , who state that for future NEG empirics to progress "it is critical to identify the free-ness of trade". In our view the estimation of the wage equation and the implications for the free-ness of trade parameter for the sample of EU regions is already very useful. So far, similar estimations have been carried out for single European countries but not for the EU at large. One of the 5 key predictions of NEG (Head and Mayer, 2004) is that agglomeration raises factor prices and this is precisely what the estimation of the wage equation sets out to establish. Our first main finding is that such a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions.
In our view the estimation of the wage equation, although important in its own right, is to some extent only a means to an end. It is for this reason that in the present paper we are less concerned with alternative explanations for a spatial wage structure, such as the existence of local human capital or (pure) technological externalities with or without spatial spillovers between regions (Combes and Overman, 2004; Ciccone and Hall, 1996 or Ciccone, 2002 -see also the contribution by Head and Mayer, 2006 to this special issue and Section 2). Our conclusion is that the estimation of a NEG wage equation gives a satisfactory explanation of spatial wage patterns, but the literature shows that the same can be said for alternative theories on spatial interactions. In fact, it is quite hard to discriminate between NEG and these alternative theories. In this paper we are also not concerned to test the NEG wage equation against simple "theory-less" alternatives like a market potential function or a related concept a gravity equation (see Brakman et al., 2004) . Our main interest is thus not to confront the NEG model with alternatives, but to ask instead what our estimations imply for the underlying NEG theory. The end of this paper is to use our estimation results as an input to analyse what the estimations entail for the degree of agglomeration across the EU regions. We confront our estimations with a multi-region version of the NEG model. One of the key characteristics of NEG models is that at some point an increase of the free-ness of trade will induce agglomeration. In order to test this prediction, we have to take the estimation results back to the model. We do this by simulating the multi-region version of the core NEG model (Krugman, 1991) for the EU regions in order to find out how the equilibrium distribution changes when the free-ness of trade changes. This takes NEG empirics a step further, and is the second main contribution of this paper. The confrontation between NEG empirics and theory also illustrates some limitations of NEG research in our view. Nevertheless, this additional step, from empirics back to NEG theory, is crucial in our view because the hallmark of NEG is the link between the free-ness of trade on the degree of agglomeration. Our paper is among the first to analyze this key relationship in order to establish the empirical relevance of NEG. Based on simulations with the multi-region NEG model and on additional evidence from bilateral sector trade data, the conclusion is that the implied free-ness of trade is such that the degree of agglomeration is still limited.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the equilibrium wage equation that is central to all NEG models is introduced and we discuss some specification issues that have to be addressed before we can take the wage equation to the data. Section 3 presents our basic estimation results. The estimation of the equilibrium wage equation yields coefficients for the transport cost or distance parameter and the substitution elasticity and thus gives an estimate for the free-ness of trade parameter. The estimations show that a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions. Subsequently, after explaining why we turn to multi-region simulations, Section 4 confronts the empirical findings with a benchmark multi-region NEG model and we conduct various simulations with this multi-region model to analyse the implications of (changes in) the free-ness of trade for the equilibrium agglomeration for the EU regions. The model makes use of the actual geography of Europe. In addition, using bilateral country trade data, Section 5 extends the analysis of the relationship between the free-ness of trade and agglomeration to the sector level. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The wage equation and some estimation issues

The wage equation
In this section we first introduce the equilibrium wage equation. The derivation of the wage equation as such is given in the Appendix. This derivation is based on Puga (1999) and quite standard by now so we merely state the wage equation in the main text (for more details on the full model see, besides Puga (1999) , also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, Chapter 14) ). For our present purposes it is important to note the equilibrium wage Eq. (1) is quite flexible in the sense that it can encompass all major NEG models.
Given that we want to apply our estimations to the multi region case of the NUTS II EU regions, we must go for the multi region version of the wage equation. For the n region (n = 1, …, r) case the following equilibrium wage equation results, see also the Appendix: (1) requires a specification of the transport costs, T rs , which will be done in the next sub-section. As is now quite standard in the NEG literature, we introduce the parameter φ, the free-ness of trade or "phi-ness" of trade parameter (Baldwin et al., 2003) , where the free-ness of trade is defined as φ rs ≡ T rs 1−ε . It is easy to interpret: φ rs = 0 denotes autarky and the absence of economic integration whereas φ rs = 1 denotes free trade and full economic integration between regions r and s.
Eq.
(1) closely resembles the "old-fashioned" market potential function. Regional wages are higher in regions that have easy access to high-wage regions nearby. This is reflected by the term ∑YT rs
(1−ε) , known as nominal market access (Redding and Venables, 2004) . Wages are also higher when there is less competition, this is the extent of competition effect, measured by the price index I s . Note, that the price index I s does not measure a competition effect in the sense in which this term is normally used (price are fixed mark-ups over marginal costs and there is no strategic interaction between firms). A low price index reflects that many varieties are produced in nearby regions and are therefore not subject to high transportation costs, this reduces the level of demand for local manufacturing varieties. Since firms' output level and price mark-up are fixed, this has to be off set by lower wages. Hence, a low (high) price index I s depresses (stimulates) regional wages W r . The inclusion of the price index in the market access term in the wage equation is important since it makes clear that we are dealing with real market access (RMA) as opposed to the market potential function where typically only nominal market access matters.
Finally, the term I −μ/(1−μ) in wage Eq. (1), is known as supplier access, SA (Redding and Venables, 2004) . A lower value of I lowers production costs and allows a higher break-even wage level. Supplier access means that when the price index is low (high), intermediate input-supplying firms are relatively close (far) to your location of production, which strengthens (weakens) agglomeration. A better supplier access (a lower value of I) lowers (wage) costs. This effect is stronger the larger the share of intermediate products, μ, in the production process. Note that with μ = 0 (no intermediate inputs) only the real market access term is left in the wage equation.
The estimation of wage Eq. (1), in principle, gives us estimates of the two key model parameters that are necessary to calculate the free-ness of trade parameter. It is, however, also clear that when we want to address the implications of our estimates for the relationship between the free-ness of trade and agglomeration, the wage equation alone will not do since we need a full-blown NEG model where we can analyse how changes in structural parameters affect the equilibrium distribution of activity. In the short-run, when the spatial distribution of firms and workers is fixed, demand differences between regions will be fully reflected in regional wage differences. Or, in other words, regional differences in real market access, RMA, and supplier access, SA, (both of which are fixed in the short run) will result in regional wage differences. But in the long run when firms and/or workers can move, these differences will also give rise to re-location of firms and/or workers (which amounts to saying that in the long-run RMA and SA are endogenous). This issue will be taken up in Section 4.2.
The main implication of the wage Eq. (1) is that regions with better real market or supplier access will have higher wages. This does not exclude alternative explanations, as we stressed in our introduction. We refer to the contribution by Head and Mayer (2006-this issue) for a discussion of and references to important alternative explanations, notably the existence of human capital externalities, of a spatial wage structure. Here, we do not test the NEG wage specification against competing explanations of a spatial wage structure. The "test" referred to in the title of our paper concerns the fact that we will use our estimation results to confront our findings with the underlying NEG model.
Specification issues
Before we can estimate wage Eq. (1) we have to take the following issues into account. First, we have to specify the distance function. We considered two options:
• T rs = T Drs , where the transports costs T rs increase exponentially with the distance between r and s, and T represents the transport cost parameter that does not vary with distance (Hanson, 2005; Brakman et al., 2004) .
• T rs = TD rs γ , where the parameters T, γ > 0 (Crozet, 2004) . The size of the distance decay parameter γ needs to be estimated and the data will decide whether transport costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r and s. If 0<γ < 1 transport costs rise less than proportionally with distance, and reflects that economies to scale (or distance) are possible with respect to transportation (the transport cost parameter T does not need to be estimated, this is a constant, see also Crozet, 2004) .
We opted for the second possibility because in that case the data decide whether transport costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r and s. Also, from a theoretical point of view, the second option is to be preferred (McCann, 2005) . The distance variable D rs will be measured in km. between NUTSII regions. The distance from a region r to itself, D rr can be modelled in several ways. For internal distance we use the proxy 0.667 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi area p p in which area is the size of region r in km 2 , (see Head and Mayer, 2000 for a discussion of this measure for internal distance). Given our specification for T rs we can calculate φ rs ≡ T rs 1−ε , given D rs , once we have estimates for ε and γ.
A second issue that we need to address is that we cannot estimate equilibrium wage Eq. (1) directly. There are not sufficient regional price index data for NUTSII regions and this means that I r cannot be measured as such. In addition, the equilibrium price index also depends on the price index in other regions. The "price index" problem can be solved in two ways. First, as in Hanson (2005) , one could try to make use of additional equilibrium conditions for a non-tradable local service sector to get rid of the price index altogether. For the case of the EU regions this would lead to new data requirements that cannot (easily) be met. This strategy also implies that interregional real wages are always equalized, which is clearly not the case in the EU. Second, we can express the price index in region r as an average of the wage in region r and the wages in center regions, corrected for the distance between region r and these center regions (see Brakman et al., 2004 , for more details). The Appendix illustrates this procedure of simplifying the price index. As a third and final issue, we observe that regional wages across Europe may differ for reasons that have nothing to do with the demand and cost linkages from the NEG literature. This leads us 1 Another solution to be able to estimate the wage equation if data on the price index I are lacking is to simply assume that I r = I s . This assumption (see Niebuhr, 2004 for an example) effectively boils down to stating that only nominal market access matters, which is not relevant for our case. Note that our discussion as to why the wage equation cannot estimated directly, starts from the idea (Hanson, 2005) that we want to estimate a single-step wage equation. A different approach pioneered by Redding and Venables (2004) is to use bilateral trade data to arrive at an estimation of real market access, this 2nd approach is followed in the contributions by Head and Mayer, and Knaap to this issue, see Head and Mayer (2006-this issue) , Section 4.2.
to another issue that needs to be addressed. Human capital externalities or (pure) technological externalities might also give rise to a spatial wage structure. These externalities imply that regions may simply differ in terms of their labour productivity. Introducing labour productivity directly as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation is, however, difficult, because these 2 variables are connected: regional labour productivity is an endogenous variable. Instead, we opted for an estimation strategy where wages are a function of the RMA and SA terms of Eq. (1) and the inclusion of truly fixed, hence exogenous controls. As fixed controls we include the physical and political geography of Europe (Combes and Overman, 2004) .
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The possibility that the physical geography (climate, elevation, access to waterways, etc.) or the political geography (borders, country-specific institutional wage arrangements, etc.) might also explain regional wage differences was taken into account as follows (see also Roos, 2005) . As proxies for physical geography we will use for the NUTSII regions the mean annual sunshine radiation (in kW h/m 2 ) and the mean elevation above sea level. We will also use dummy variables when a region borders the sea, has direct access to (navigable) waterways, or is a border region. To capture the possibility of country-specific determinants of wages (like the centralisation of wage setting) we also use country-dummies as control variables. The physical and political geography variables capture the fixed features of the economic geography that may have a bearing on regional wages. By fixed we mean that these variables are not determined by the location decisions of mobile firms or workers. 
Estimation results
After taking the specification issues discussed above into account, we estimate (in logs):
where ϕ rs ≡ (T rs ) 1−ε = (TD rs ) γ(1−ε) and internal distance D rr = 0.667 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi area p p in which area is the size of region r in km 2 ; and Z i = set of additional control variables for each region that potentially consists of mean annual sunshine; mean elevation above sea-level; and dummy variables (country-dummy, border-region dummy, access to sea dummy, access to navigable waterway dummy), for more information on the data used and the definition of variables see the Appendix.
What is immediately apparent from the wage equation is that the supplier access (SA) term is correlated with the real market access (RMA) term. The multicollinearity between RMA and SA is discussed at length by Redding and Venables (2004) and Knaap (2004) . We follow these authors and opt for RMA. In our case, the lack of data on regional price indices makes this choice rather straightforward! In some of our estimations we have, following Redding and Venables (2004) , experimented with including the distance of each region to the economic centers as an (timeinvariant) approximation for supplier access. This did, however, not affect or improve our main results. Implicitly we will assume that in our estimations SA is constant (it may vary over time but not between regions). Note that by focussing on the RMA-term, the wage equation becomes identical to the equilibrium wage equation in Krugman (1991) .
In addition, there are other econometric issues to be addressed like the endogeneity of the variables (e.g. income) that make up the real market access term (Hanson, 2005; Mion, 2003) . We estimated wage Eq. (1′) in levels and also, without the time-invariant control variables, in 1st differences, and, following Hanson (2005) , we did all this by measuring the RMA term at a higher level of aggregation (NUTSI) than wages (NUTSII) level in order to preclude that (wage) shocks in NUTSII region r can have a large impact on the market access term in Eq. (1′). We used 2SLS non-linear least squares (NLS) as our estimation procedure. When estimating in levels, the Glejser test indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity so the estimation results reported below are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
The sample period is 1992-2000. Since the estimation of the wage equation is a means to an end, our goal is to get "reasonable" estimates for the substitution elasticity ε and the distance parameter γ, in order to calculate the free-ness of trade parameter. Table 1 gives the results of estimating Eq. (1′) in levels, where income Y s is for NUTSI regions. To deal with the ever-present problem of endogeneity in NEG estimations, we instrumented income too. Table 1 gives the NLS results of estimating (1′) where the estimation is the second stage of a 2SLS NLS regression where in the first stage regression income was regressed upon its initial level in 1991, a country specific time trend, country-dummies and a border dummy. This is a simple way to instrument income (1st stage results are not reported here, but available upon request). Overall, see Combes and Overman (2004) , our list of econometric "checks and balances" (NLS estimation, use of IV, estimation in levels as well as in 1st differences, measuring income Y on a higher level (NUTSI) of aggregation) is very much in line with the related and seminal NEG studies by Hanson (2005) or Redding and Venables (2004) .
The coefficient for the substitution elasticity ε is in line with other studies (indicating relative strong economies of scale), see for instance Broda and Weinstein (2004) for sector evidence for the USA or Hanson and Xiang (2004) for recent international evidence. The estimation results for the distance coefficient imply that γ < 1 which indicates that transport costs increases less than proportionally with distance. Also note that the fixed controls perform quite well, they are significant and have mostly the expected sign. The estimation results support the idea of a spatial wage structure: wages fall the further one moves away from economic centers. A higher RMAterm in wage Eq. (1′) implies higher wages in region r. The prediction from NEG models that agglomeration leads to higher factor prices in the center-regions is thus confirmed by the estimation results in Table 1 . When we estimated wage Eq. (1′) for each individual year for our sample period 1992-2000, we also found a spatial wage structure. Moreover, the estimation results for the two key parameters (ε and γ) for each year were such that the implied free-ness of trade did not really change between 1992 and 2000. The 1990s are for the EU a period associated with increasing economic integration but thus does not show up in an increase of the free-ness of trade parameter over time. 4 The fact that we find a spatial wage structure runs counter to those NEG models where wages between regions are equalized because of an infinitely elastic labour supply. With an infinitely elastic labour supply, adjustment between center and peripheral regions takes place (in the long run) through movements of firms and workers only, which implies equalization of wages and RMA across regions (Head and Mayer, 2006-this issue, Eq. (10) ). This observation and the fact that it does not hold for our sample of EU regions, will be used in the next section to explain why we turn to multi-region simulations. Finally, as indicated before, the estimation of the coefficients for ε and γ enables us to calculate the free-ness of trade parameter for any pair of regions r and s at the distance D rs .
The finding that a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions is important in its own right but, as we stated before, we want to go beyond the estimation of the wage equation and also address what these estimations imply for the relationship between economic integration and agglomeration. This relationship is at the heart of NEG theory. In order to do this, we need to go beyond the equilibrium wage equation and turn to a complete NEG model. In doing so, we take the estimates of Table 1 as our empirical benchmark, ε = 2.98 and γ = 0.38.
Free-ness of trade and agglomeration: multi-region simulations
Three options to go from empirics back to theory
To analyze the implications of changes in the free-ness of trade for the degree of agglomeration, the mere estimation of the wage equation as such is clearly not sufficient. Ultimately, the hallmark of NEG (see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004) is that the location of footloose firms and factors of production is endogenous. For the real market access (RMA) term in Eq. (1) this means that in the long-run RMA, and the regional demand differences which it reflects, cannot be taken as given. In particular, neither income Y s nor the price index I s can be considered to be fixed in the long run from a NEG perspective. Ideally, we would like to be able, for the case n (= 1, …, r) EU regions, to analytically derive what the relationship is between the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration. And in doing so, we would like to allow both factor prices and interregional factor movements to act as adjustment mechanisms to determine the equilibrium spatial allocation across regions.
5 At present, there are no analytical solutions for the case of more than 2 regions. In our view there are three strategies available from the NEG literature to deal with this issue, and we will explain below why we decided to go for the third option (multi-region simulations).
The first option is to assume that either mobile workers or wages do all of the adjustment Mayer, 2006-this issue and Fujita et al., 1999, Chapter 4) . The latter boils down to the assumption that the RMA is exogenous. In our view, see the discussion in the previous section, both alternatives are not very appealing for our present purposes, since in reality one may expect that the equilibrium spatial allocation is the result of both price and quantity adjustments. In the important contributions to the empirics of NEG, Redding and Venables (2004) and Head and Mayer (2006-this issue) , for instance, estimate an equivalent of wage Eq. (1′) and assume that wages do all of the adjustment by assuming that the RMA (or SA) is exogenous.
Our estimation results in Table 1 do indeed lend support to a spatial wage structure and thereby the idea that real market access and supplier access are higher in or near center regions. In line with Head and Mayer (2006- this issue, see their Fig. 1) , it is indeed the case for our sample of EU regions that the RMA term -and thus wages-is higher for regions that are close the center of the EU, see the top panel of our Fig. 1 . The top panel of Fig. 1 shows for each EU region the real market access (fitted values based on Table 1 for 1992 data) and the distance of the region to the NUTSII region of Limburg in Belgium which is the most central region in our EU sample. It is clear that RMA is higher for regions that are closer to the center of the EU. At the same time, however, the data and our estimation results for the EU regions indicate, see the right panel of Fig.  1 , that the spatial distribution of RMA is not constant over time indicating that the degree of agglomeration cannot be taken as fixed a priori. During the period 1992-2000 some regions experienced quite a substantial change in their RMA.
The second option to investigate the relationship between the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration is to identify the so-called breakpoints explicitly, and substitute parameter estimates in the analytical expressions for the breakpoints. This is possible for two region NEG models, as is shown by Puga (1999) , but not for multi-region models.
6 One could conduct a thought experiment by assuming that each region by itself faces the rest-of-the-world. The disadvantage of such a thought experiment, however, is that it artificially forces a multi-region world into a two-region thought experiment.
The third option is to address the relationship between the, empirically grounded, free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration, by using numerical simulations based on a multi-region NEG model. 7 The model we will use is the core NEG model (Krugman, 1991) where, in line with our estimations of the wage equation, we will extend the model by controlling for the actual geography of Europe. It is to these multi-region simulations that we turn next. The argument to use simulations in a multi-region NEG setting for any "realistic" depiction of geography is forcefully made by Fujita and Mori (2005, pp. 394-395) .
Free-ness of trade and agglomeration in a multi-region NEG model
In this sub-section we will show what changes in the free-ness of trade imply for the spatial distribution of economic activity, hence for the degree of agglomeration across the EU regions. In doing so, we use a n-region NEG model where n = 157, so we have 157 regions in our experiment and for each set of model parameters we will run simulations to determine the equilibrium allocation of economic activity, where economic activity is measured as gross value added (the Y variable in Eq. (1)). Our NEG model of choice is the core NEG model of Krugman (1991) . The Krugman (1991) model assumes space to be neutral but in keeping with our preferred specification of the wage Eq. (1′), we extend the model by making space non-neutral by taking the actual physical geography of Europe into account. To do this, we apply the methodology of Stelder (2005) and introduce non-neutral space. Non-neutral space is defined here as a grid of n locations on a three-dimensional surface. The distance between 2 locations is calculated as the shortest path, on the assumption that each location on the grid is connected with its direct (horizontal or vertical) neighbours with distance 1 and with its diagonal neighbours with distance √2. Non-neutral space is then introduced by making "holes" in the grid. The geographical shape of a country or a region is approximated by using a grid resolution as high as possible. The model allows for specific costs for transport across land, sea and in hubs where (un)shipping takes place. In addition, with an extra altitude layer the grid is extended with a 3rd dimension (height). In this way the model can deal with mountains too. 6 Breakpoints define the values of the free-ness of trade parameter in 2-region NEG models at which, when moving from a low to a higher free-ness of trade, the spreading or symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and (partial) agglomeration becomes the stable equilibrium. In NEG models with inelastic labour supply, there may be an additional breakpoint at a high free-ness of trade in the sense that the (partial) agglomeration equilibrium becomes unstable and there will be renewed spreading (the graph illustrating this is the so-called bell-shaped curve or inverted U-curve). Analytical solutions for breakpoints for the case of n > 2 regions only exist, however, for the case when distance is normalized (see Appendix in Puga, 1999) . This is an innocent assumption to make as long as n = 2 but clearly not when n > 2 because it means assuming equidistant regions. 7 In Section 5, we use bilateral sector trade data for various country pairs to answer the same question. In Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2005a), following Crozet (2004) , we show the results (with the caveats mentioned here in mind) of confronting our estimation results with the break point conditions from the 2-region model by Puga (1999) . As pointed out by the referee, the main problem with using a 2-region model is that it is, by construction, silent on the features of the geography of the multi-region world. Talking about regions 1 and 2 (with n = 2), say Paris and London, being in a spreading or agglomeration equilibrium is troublesome when the sample consists of many regions besides (and lying inbetween) Paris and London. Apart from the depiction of non-neutral space the model is similar to the Krugman (1991) which means that the simulation of the equilibrium allocation of economic activity hinges on 3 model parameters: the share of income spent on manufactures (δ = 0.3 in our simulations), and very importantly from our perspective, the substitution elasticity and the distance parameter. Adding non-neutral space has a number of advantages. First, in wage Eq. (1′) we explicitly used the physical geography of Europe as a control variable and this is also a characteristic of our simulations. Second, the use of the actual geography of Europe also means that our simulations are more realistic than for instance the well-known (12 region) race track simulations or the "seamless world" multi-region NEG models, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, Chapters 6 and 17, respectively). Our sample includes the bulk of EU regions.
9 Related studies like Forslid et al. (2002) , Midelfart et al. (2003) or Brülhart et al. (2004) have found for the EU and its regions that agglomeration forces tend to be rather localized. In order to maximize the chance of finding strong agglomeration effects, the Krugman (1991) NEG model is useful because this model has an agglomeration bias: the model gives rise relatively easily to (near-)complete agglomeration, where all of the footloose economic activity is concentrated in one or at most a very few regions.
Starting with the initial distribution of regional gross value added across the regions and given our preferred estimates of γ and ε, one can simulate the long-run equilibrium situation in Europe, i.e., an outcome where real wages across regions are equalized. Fig. 2 shows the outcome of such a simulation exercise (gross value added for the European regions is normalized to 1, regions where activity is concentrated are darker compared to more peripheral regions). Fig. 2A gives the initial (1992) distribution and Fig. 2B , C and D show the equilibrium distribution for 3 multi-region simulations: the equilibrium distribution with our model parameter estimates from Table 1 (ε =2.98, γ = 0.38), a lower distance parameter (γ = 0.05) and an increased substitution elasticity (ε =9.0), respectively.
10 Our addition of non-neutral space does not alter the procedure to simulate the longrun equilibrium compared to for instance the n-region racetrack version of the Krugman (1991) model. For any given distribution of mobile workers, the equilibrium wage equation together with the equilibrium price index equation and the income equation give solutions for the endogenous variables Y r , W r , and I r for every region r. With interregional labour mobility a long-run equilibrium is reached interregional real wages are equalized, where the real wage is defined as w r = W r (I r ) −δ . This is standard in the NEG literature by now so we will not dwell on this topic here, but see for instance Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, Chapters 4 and 5), Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2001, Chapters 3 and 4) or Baldwin et al. (2003, Chapter 2) . Fig. 2A depicts the initial (1992) distribution. Ranging from black to white, darker areas denote regions that have a relatively larger share of the overall gross value added. Agglomerations are found roughly along the lines of the so called European banana, ranging from London to Belgium and the south-western part of the Netherlands via west and south-west Germany to northern Italy, the central position of Paris is also noteworthy (to highlight the special position of London, each figure gives the share of London and its adjacent regions in the upper-left part of the figures). Based on our parameter estimations, Fig. 2B then uses the multi-region simulation with our Krugman (1991) cum physical geography model to arrive at the long-run equilibrium for the European regions based on our estimations of the free-ness of trade: ε = 2.98, γ = 0.38. Compared 9 To be specific in the multi-region simulations we used real GDP data for 157 regions in 10 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK) and Switzerland. 10 In these 3 simulations the share of income spent on manufactured goods (δ) is set at 0.3. For the regions included in our multi-region experiment, the maps show for each region the share of the region in total gross valued added. For every region, going from black to white, a darker (lighter) colour signals a larger (lower) share. Since we are interested in relative changes, we want to find out if a region changes "colour" when we compare Fig. 2A , B, C, and D. to the initial distribution, the region around Paris and the region around Milan are for instance able to attract more economic activity. The same holds for other initially larger regions like London or the southern part of western Germany. In general, when comparing Fig. 2A and B, core regions clearly gain at the expense of nearby regions. Also, our equilibrium simulation predicts more agglomeration than was actually observed in 1992. But, even with this tendency towards agglomeration, the long-run equilibrium associated with Fig. 2B is not one for which the European regions have collapsed into a strong core-periphery pattern whereby one or just a few regions have attracted all of the economic activity. So, despite the above mentioned agglomeration bias of the Krugman (1991) model, Fig. 2B still yields a considerable degree of dispersion that is qualitatively (but not quantitatively, see below) similar to the actual spatial distribution as shown by Fig. 2A .
To investigate what happens to the degree of agglomeration when the free-ness of trade would change (compared to Fig. 2B ), we also simulated long-run equilibria for larger values of the freeness of trade than those implied by our estimations for the substitution elasticity and the distance parameter in Table 1 , see Fig. 2C for just one example. These additional simulations reinforce the above conclusions. When we increase the free-ness of trade, that is when we decrease the distance parameter or the substitution elasticity, core regions increase further in economic importance and smaller regions in the vicinity of those larger regions lose out. When the distance parameter is for instance set at a very low level, γ = 0.05 (implying ceteris paribus a very high free-ness of trade), Fig. 2C shows that only 4 regions "survive" in the sense that all of the economic activity is now concentrated in these 4 regions (London, Paris, Madrid, and Lombardia) only. This is line with the underlying NEG model where for a high free-ness of trade (near-)complete agglomeration is the stable long-run equilibrium in a 2-region setting. Also in line with the underlying NEG model is that one ends up with a more even spatial allocation of economic activity when the free-ness of 
trade falls. In Fig. 2D this is done by increasing the substitution elasticity indicating weaker economies of scale: ε = 9.0 (with γ = 0.38). Clearly, compared to Fig. 2B and C, peripheral regions now typically have a larger share of economic activity. In fact, the resulting equilibrium is rather similar to the initial (1992) distribution as depicted by Fig. 2A . Finally, and only by way of illustration, Table 2 shows the degree of inequality (as measured by the Theil index) for our set of EU regions for respectively the 1992 data ( Fig. 2A) , the 2000 data (last year of our sample), the equilibrium simulation of Fig. 2B , and the equilibrium simulation of Fig. 2D .
11 Table 2 gives both within-country inequality and the degree of inequality for the EU as whole (here, our 157 European regions). From Table 2 we can see (compare the 1992 and 2000 columns) that between 1992 and 2000 inequality has (slightly) decreased indicating some convergence, but that this is not necessarily true for within-country inequality.
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More importantly for our present purposes, the inequality results for the long-run equilibrium allocation based on our estimations (see Fig. 2B ) show that our simulations with the NEG model results in more inequality than is actually observed. Note also that, compared to the EU as whole, within countries like the UK, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy where the core regions are located (see Fig. 2B ), the increase in degree of inequality typically is rather large. This suggests that the core regions in these countries, in comparing Fig. 2A and B, inter alia "gain" at the expense of the other (nearby) regions in their country. The last column of Table 2 shows that by lowering the free-ness of trade, based in the simulation underlying Fig. 2D , the degree of inequality is rather similar to that measure by using the actual data.
Bilateral trade flows and sector φ's
Our estimations and the subsequent analysis in Section 4 are based on aggregate data for each NUTSII region. That is to say, we did not use regional data on the distribution of wages, valued added or other variables for the various sectors in a region. The reason is simply that these data are not available at the NUTS II level. In order to arrive at an "educated guess" what the free-ness of trade parameter could look like for various manufacturing sectors for the EU and as a complement to our analysis in Sections 3 and 4, we follow Head and Mayer (2004) . They explain that the freeness of trade parameter can be approximated through the use of bilateral trade and production data. These data are available at the country level (and, not at the EU regional level). Based on Head and Ries (2001) , they define a very simple estimator for the free-ness of trade parameter which can be derived from any basic NEG model:
where the numerator denotes the imports of country i from country j and vice versa; the denominator denotes for both country i and country j the value of all shipments of a industry minus the sum of shipments to all other countries Mayer, 2004, p. 2618) .
11 For the case of Fig. 2C it is obvious that there is a very strong degree of inequality. Note that the Theil index does not take the spatial ordering of regions into account, the contiguity of the regions is not an issue. See Brakman et al. (2005b, Chapter 3) , for measures of agglomeration for the EU regions that do take this contiguity or in other words the geography into account, these alternative measures give rise to similar conclusions as to those based on Table 2 . 12 As an aside, the fact that there may been some convergence on the European level is in line with the bottom panel in Fig. 1 , where regions with an initially smaller real market access (RMA) saw their RMA increase between 1992 and 2000.
If the bilateral trade between these 2 countries is relatively important (unimportant), φ trade is relatively high (low): 0 < φ trade < 1. The advantage of this "estimator" for the free-ness of trade parameter is that no actual estimations are required. Head and Mayer calculate φ trade for 21 industries and two country pairs (Canada/USA and France/Germany) for 1995 and then confront their implied free-ness of trade parameter with the industry-specific break points for the free-ness of trade as derived in Puga (1999) . As has been mentioned before, Puga (1999) derives these break-points for 2 core NEG models, the crucial difference between the 2 models in his analysis is the degree of interregional labour mobility. Without interregional labour mobility, the relationship between the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration yields the well-known Tomahawk figure (the Krugman (1991) model belongs this class of NEG models). With interregional labour mobility, this relationship gives rise the well-known Bell Shaped Curve (a.k.a. inverted U curve), see Head and Mayer (2004) .
More specifically, Head and Mayer (2004) confront φ trade with the industry specific break points for the Bell Shaped Curve and in particular with φ low B (the 1st break point where the level of the free-ness of trade is such that spreading turns into (partial) agglomeration). In keeping with the fact that the breakpoints have only been derived analytically in a 2-region model, Head and Mayer (2004) conduct their experiment for 2 pairs of countries (USA v Canada; France v Germany). The industry specific values are derived by plugging in industry-specific values for the respective parameters in the break condition. 13 The main result is that, almost without exception, for each of the 21 industries φ trade is rather low (in the range of 0.1-0.2) to the effect that for both pairs of countries most industries are still to the left of the bell-part: that is, φ trade < φ low B . This means that most industries in this bilateral experiment are (still) in the spreading equilibrium.
We applied Head and Mayer's methodology for the case of the EU to see how our results compared to their findings and also to see if our main conclusions from the previous section carry over to the sector level. To provide a link with the analysis in Section 4, we not only looked at the break point φ low B associated with the Bell Shaped Curve but also at the break point for the Tomahawk, the NEG model with international labour mobility (denoted by φ labmob B ) because this is the relevant benchmark for the Krugman (1991) model that we used in our multi-region simulations. In our first experiment we took Germany as our benchmark country and paired Germany with 3 other EU countries (Spain, UK, and the Netherlands) and with a new EU member (Poland). Using as much as possible the Head and Mayer sector classification (see Table 3 ) we calculated φ trade for the 4 country pairs for the years 1985, 1990, 1994 and 1998 . For the first 3 years we used World Bank data and for 1998 we used the OECD STAN data. Data for Poland were only available for 1990 and 1994. In line with the findings by Head and Mayer, the respective values for our φ trade gradually increase over time but they remain relatively low. Only for a few sectors we came up with a φ trade that exceeds the break point φ low B in the bell-shaped curve model and φ labmob in the tomahawk case. The sectors with agglomeration in some years are clothing, wood, plastics and drugs, ferrous metals, and transport. The overall picture is, however, one of a "pre-agglomeration" degree of economic integration (results not shown here but available upon request).
Our second experiment was to compute φ trade for the bilateral sector trade between the group of 15 EU countries versus the group of 10 accession countries, the new EU members from central and eastern Europe. Based on GTAP data for 1997 for the trade between these 2 "regions", Table 3 gives the computed free-ness of trade parameter φ trade and compares this implied degree of economic integration with the two breakpoints φ low B (the bell-shaped curve) as well as with φ labmob (the tomahawk model) where the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. The parameter values needed for the derivation of these 2 break-points for the various manufacturing sectors are taken from Head and Mayer (2004a, see their Appendix) . For "nonmanufacturing sectors" agriculture, energy and services such a theoretical benchmark was not readily available. For the manufacturing sectors the overall conclusion must be that the degree of economic integration for most sectors is such that we are not (yet) in the agglomeration regime. The exceptions are (see the scores in bold) Plastics and Drugs, Ferrous Metals, and Vehicles. However, even for these 3 sectors the free-ness of trade parameter is such that these sectors are only at the start of the upward sloping part of the bell-curve (see the respective φ bell-top values which gives the peak of the bell-curve for these sectors).
14 In our view the results in Table 3 with a free-ness of trade parameter based on bilateral trade data on the country level are in line with the conclusions in the previous section based on regional data. The bilateral trade data on which Table 3 is based suggest the spatial reach 14 Where φ bell-top is simply taken to be the midpoint
of agglomeration forces is probably still rather limited in the sense that it is not the case (yet) that (sectoral) economic activity is concentrated in one or a very few regions only.
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Conclusions
The estimation of the equilibrium wage equation for the EU NUTSII regions yields information on the so called free-ness of trade that stands for the degree of economic integration in new economic geography (NEG) models. Our paper makes two contributions to the literature on the empirical relevance of the new economic geography. Both contributions follow from the list of five NEG hypotheses as given by Head and Mayer (2004) . One of these hypotheses is that agglomeration raises factor prices and this is precisely what the estimation of the wage equation sets out to establish. Our first main finding is that, indeed, such a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions. So far, see the survey by Combes and Overman (2004) , estimations like these have been confined to single or a small sub set of EU countries. A next step would be to test this NEG-explanation against alternative explanations for a spatial wage structure and in doing so to discriminate between NEG and these other theories, but as a 1st pass of the empirical relevance of NEG one should establish if NEG estimations are borne out by the facts.
A second hypothesis of the Head and Mayer (2004) list is that at some point a fall in trade costs (an increase of the free-ness of trade), will induce agglomeration. In our view this hypothesis is the hallmark of NEG. Based on our estimation results, we have used multi-region simulations to establish what our implied free-ness of trade parameter would imply for the degree of agglomeration for EU regions. We also used bilateral sector trade data to learn more about the relationship between free-ness of trade and agglomeration from an empirical point of view. In both the multi-region simulations and the analysis based on the trade data, the main conclusion is that the implied free-ness of trade is such that the degree of agglomeration is limited. Our paper is among the first to address this crucial but thorny issue of the relationship between free-ness of trade and agglomeration from an empirical point of view using estimations grounded on a NEG model. This issue is thorny because, as we have argued in Section 4.1, analytically NEG theory is very much focussed on the case of 2 regions which is a problem in a multi-region world. We very much agree with Fujita and Mori (2005) when they state that "in order to investigate the spatial pattern of agglomeration, the asymmetry rather than the symmetry of location space is necessary where not all other regions are neighbours of each region" (Fujita and Mori, 2005, p. 394) . 15 In this section as in Section 5, we are basically concerned with the question how changes in the free ness of trade may change the degree of agglomeration. In our view, this is ultimately what NEG is about: how do changes in the key model parameters determine agglomeration (the spatial allocation of economic activity) where the latter is an endogenous variable. Having said this, other (trade or location) theories may also have implications for the attractiveness of regions. In, for instance, Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) it is found that national productivity (and thus most likely also wages) is positively effected by real openness. Note, however, that our concept of RMA is not fundamentally different from the notion of real openness (exports plus imports to GDP measured in terms of PPP) employed by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) , as one might expect a strong correlation between the two. A main difference between the NEG approach with its emphasis on RMA and the trade related approaches, see also Frankel and Romer (1999) for a good example, is that the RMA term and hence the degree of agglomeration is endogenous whereas in the trade literature openness is exogenous. Moreover, when analyzing structural changes like a change in transport costs the emphasis is on the implications for specialization (and not agglomeration), see for instance Figure Although we take the NEG theory seriously empirically, these are very much preliminary results and these results point also to the (current) limitations of confronting NEG empirics with NEG theory. Nevertheless, our main findings are interesting because they constitute, to our knowledge, one of the first attempts to confront estimations of the key structural NEG model parameters with theoretical NEG predictions as to how changes in the free-ness of trade may affect the spatial distribution of economic activity. There is much that can be done to improve upon our findings. Three avenues of research come to mind. The first one is to come up with NEG models that incorporate key features like the difference between interregional and international labour mobility within a single model (see Behrens et al., 2003; Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran, 2004 ). This might lead to additional testable hypotheses that allow for a better choice between various NEG agglomeration mechanisms and between NEG and alternative theories of spatial interactions. The second avenue is simply to engage in better testing by making use of (econometric) insights from outside NEG proper (Fingleton, 2004; Combes and Overman, 2004) , by making use of new (micro) data sets that are increasingly becoming available , and finally by differentiating in empirical research between NEG and theoretical alternatives (Head and Mayer, 2006-this issue) . The third issue that needs to be taken up in future research is the tension between NEG empirics based on multiple regions on the one hand, and the NEG theory where analytical results are too often only available for 2 regions on the other hand. Until more progress has been made on these issues, simulations will remain a vital (and very useful) element of NEG.
A.2. Derivation of the equilibrium wage equation
A.2.1. Demand
Assume an economy with two sectors, a numéraire sector (H), and a manufacturing (M) sector. As a short cut one often refers to H as the agricultural sector to indicate that this industry is tied to a specific location. Every consumer in the economy shares the same, Cobb-Douglas, preferences for both types of commodities:
The parameter δ is the share of income spent on manufactured goods. M is a CES sub-utility function of many varieties.
Maximizing the sub-utility subject to the relevant income constraint, i.e. the part of income that is spent on manufactures, δE, gives the demand for each variety, j: Firms also use varieties from the M sector as intermediate inputs.
Assuming that all varieties are necessary in the production process and that the elasticity of substitution is the same for firms as for consumers, we can use the same CES-aggregator function for producers as for consumers, with the same corresponding price index, I. Given spending on intermediates, we can derive demand functions for varieties of producers which are similar to those of consumers. Total demand for a variety, j, can now be represented as:
where Y is defined as Y ¼ dE þ lnpx ⁎ . The first term on the right hand side of Y comes from consumers, representing the share of income E that is spent on all M-varieties, the second term on the right-hand side comes from firm demand for intermediate inputs, this is equal to the value of all varieties in a region, npx ⁎ , multiplied by the share of intermediates in the production process, μ (see below); x ⁎ denotes the equilibrium supply of a manufacturing variety by a single firm, see below.
A.2.2. Manufacturing supply Next, turn to the supply side. Each variety, i, is produced according to the following cost function, C(x i ):
where the coefficients α and β describe, the fixed and marginal input requirement per variety. The input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor, with price (wages) W, and intermediates, represented by the price index I. Maximizing profits gives the familiar mark-up pricing rule (note that marginal costs consists of two elements, labor and intermediates):
Using the zero profit condition, p i x i ¼ I l W ð1−lÞ i ða þ bx i Þ, and the mark-up pricing rule (5), gives the break-even supply of a variety i (each variety is produced by a single firm):
A.2.3. Equilibrium with transport costs Furthermore, transportation of manufactures is costly. Transportation costs T are so-called iceberg transportation costs: T 12 > 1 units of the manufacturing good have to be shipped from region 1 to region 2 for one unit of the good to actually arrive in region 2. Assume, for illustration purposes, that the two regions -1 and 2 -are the only regions. Total demand for a product from, for example region 1, now comes from two regions, 1 and 2. The consumers and firms in region 2 have to pay transportation costs on their imports. This leads to the following total demand for a variety produced in region 1: where the constant, Const, is a function of (fixed) model parameters.
Similarly for the n region (n = 1, …, r) case we arrive at the following equilibrium wage equation, and this is the wage Eq. (1) , I s is the price index for manufactured goods, ε is the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods and T rs are the iceberg transport costs between regions r and s. In Section 4.2 we use the multi-region version of the wage equation to determine the long-run equilibrium. In doing so, we make use of the Krugman (1991) model which results from the Puga (1999) model when there are no intermediate inputs (μ = 0) and the H and M sectors use totally different inputs (Puga, 1999, p. 316) . For any given distribution of mobile firms and workers the Krugman (1991) model the equilibrium wage equation together with the equilibrium price index equation and the income equation give solutions for the endogenous variables Y r , W r , and I r for every region r. With interregional labour mobility a long-run equilibrium is reached interregional real wages are equalized, where the real wage is defined as w r = W r (I s ) −δ . This is all rather standard in the NEG literature by now, see also for instance Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, Chapters 4 and 5) or Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2001, Chapters 3 and 4) .
A.3. How to approximate the price index I?
For the model without intermediate inputs (μ = 0), we proceeded as follows. For each region we focus on two prices: the price in district r of a manufactured good produced in district r and the average price outside district r of a manufactured good produced outside district r. The determination of the simplified local price index for manufactures requires a measure of distance between region r and the regions outside. The distance from the economic center is an appropriate measure in our view. This center is obtained by weighing the distances with relative Y. Here we make use of the estimation results based for a simple market-potential function for our sample of EU NUTSII regions. Regions with largest market-potential MP, see Table A1 , are considered to be centers where for each region its MP is defined as:
The distance between a region r and the nearest center region (out of the list of the 35 regions with the largest MP for the NUTSII regions, see Table A1) whereW r is the average wage outside district r, and weight λ r is region r's share of employment in manufacturing, which is proportional to the number of varieties of manufactures (λ is proxied by (regional employment) / (EU employment)). For the model with intermediate inputs this "trick" to approximate the price index, now the price index for intermediates, would not do as easily (but recall that in our estimations we assumed μ =0). The reason is that the equilibrium price index is now not only a function of wages but also of itself.
